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ROSALIE M. MOYNAHANt
PRELIMINARY STATEMENT
On June 27, 1936, a decision was rendered by the probate
judge of Cuyahoga County, Ohio, with the introductory state-
ment that "This court is interested in the case at bar, from both
a legal and a social point of view."'
The matter had come before Judge Brewer as a routine
motion to vacate the appointment of an administratrix in favor
of one claiming a prior right to administer the estate of Eva
Speeler, deceased. However, the extraordinary feature of the
case which aroused the court's interest, and which has had such
a far-reaching social and legal history, lay in the fact that the
acting administratrix was the daughter of the dead woman by
an early marriage, whereas the person seeking to supplant that
daughter was an alleged husband "by the common law." This
man, William Feeney, asserted that during the last ten years
of her life he and Eva Speeler had been united in a common-
law marriage and that, as her surviving husband, he was entitled
to priority of administrative appointment.
* All opinions expressed in this article are those of the author as an indi-
vidual only. They are in no sense binding upon either the Social Security
Board or the Office of the General Counsel to that Board. The author is
indebted to Mr. David L. Waldron, Review Attorney, of the General Coun-
sel's Office of the Social Security Board, for valuable suggestions during prepa-
ration of the manuscript.
t Member of the Bar of the State of New York; Research Attorney,
Office of the General Counsel, Social Security Board.
1 re Estate of Eva Speeler, Deceased, 6 Ohio Opinions 529, 27 O.L.
Abs. 223 (1936).
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A careful consideration of the evidence,2 introduced in sup-
port of Mr. Feeney's claim, led the court to deny the motion
in the following language:
We can only assume from these facts that Mrs. Speeler entered
into this relationship for immoral purposes. She is a woman who had
been twice married and was living with another man at the time Mr.
Feeney entered the scene. He knew and the neighbors knew of the
improper relationship of Mr. Marcus and this woman. (This court
could as well be opened to the suggestion of whether Mr. Marcus is
not or could not claim that he is the common-law husband.) The evi-
dence does not show that Mrs. Speeler got a divorce from Mr. Marcus
although it does show that they lived together for some years. This
court cannot conceive of a man allegedly loving a woman enough to
make her his common-law wife, and yet not being interested enough
for the sake of common decency to avoid the slightest suspicion by marry-
ing according to law. According to the contention of counsel for Mr.
Feeney, the court could well assume Mr. Marcus was the common-law
husband in the first place, and Mr. Feeney merely a man breaking sup-
posedly matrimonial bonds. Where, then, can this court draw a line of
demarcation between adultery and common-law marriage? (Italics the
court's.)
Citing earlier Ohio decisions, which will be discussed in
detail presently, Judge Brewer stated certain Ohio rules with
respect to common-law marriage.
Common law marriages are recognized in Ohio, but as a matter of
public policy such marriages are not favored.'
Adultery will never, however long continued, constitute marriage.4
2 The syllabus of the case summarizes this evidence as follows: "Where
the evidence shows that decedent entered into a ceremonial marriage with her
first husband N, and after his death entered into a ceremonial marriage with
S, and after the death of S, she lived and cohabited with one M, and later
meeting W, said to M, 'Bill (W) is my man now and I don't want any more
of you' and thereafter TV began to cohabit with her, later moving into the
hotel she owned, purchased her an engagement ring, and was introduced by
her as her husband, ITV having no other employment save working around the
hotel, such cohabitation continuing from October 1925 to March 1936, Held:
such facts do not constitute a common-law marriage between decedent and W."
Additional evidence indicated that Fenney (W) and Mrs. Speeler had opened
joint bank accounts, and that nurses who had taken care of Feeney during a
hospital stay had believed him to be her husband.
3 In re Barrett, 49 Bull. 222 (904).4 Swartz v. State, 13 O.C.C. 6z (1896), 7 O.C.D. 43, affirmed State v.
Swartz, 35 Bull. 358. See also 18 O.C.C. 892, 9 O.C.D. 855.
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A common-law marriage must be based on the meeting of minds
and a mutual contract, and must be followed by cohabitation and con-
duct which establishes belief among the neighbors that the relationship
exists. s
The court proceeded to distinguish the facts in the case at
bar from those in the three' cases that have always been cited
as landmarks in the judicial history of common-law marriages
in Ohio. Of the two decisions recognizing that status, the legit-
imacy of children was involved in Umbenhower v. Labgs, while
in Carmichael v. State a common-law marriage was upheld in
affirming a conviction for bigamy. Had Judge Brewer based
his decision in the Speeler case on the law as stated in these
precedents, and on the contrasting facts and insufficiency of the
evidence in that case, that decision while justified would not
have been remarkable. But in addition the Court buttressed its
opinion with quotations from authorities interested in the status
of common-law marriage from the sociological as well as the
legal standpoint, such as Richmond and Hall,' Goodsell,' and
Otto E. Koegel.'
' Gillmore v. Doming, 3i 0. L. Rep. 588 (930).
6 Dunca; v. Duncaip, io O.S. 18i (1859) reversing 4 0. Dec. Rep. z6,
Clev. L. Rep. 29 (1856); Carmichael v. State, 12 0.S. 553 (186x); Umben-
kower v. Labus, 85 O.S. 238, 97 N.E. 832 (1912), affirming iz O.C.C.
(N.S.) 289.
7"Marriage and the State," Russell Sage Foundation, New York, I9z9.
8 "History of the Family as a Social and Educational Institution." Judge
Brewer, in quoting with approval Goodsell's reflection, credits it to "Matri-
monial Institutions," an equally authoritative work, but written by Howard.
The quotation appearing at page 537 of Goodsell's work reads: Is it not
an amazing fact, that, in a matter which so profoundly affects the dignity and
stability of a family institution, society should be so slow to take enlightened
action? Surely, no legislative reform is more needed than clear and positive
statutes declaring such loosely contracted unions null and void."
' "Common-Law Marriage," Washington, 1922, which undertakes to
prove:
i. That common-law marriages have not been valid in England since
1753-
2. That such marriages were valid prior to that time, notwithstanding a
decision of the House of Lords in 1843 that they were never valid
in England.
3. That such marriages were invalid at common law for possessory pur-
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In summarizing the history of non-ceremonial marriage on
the continent, in England and in the United States, Judge
Brewer listed (with particular emphasis on recent additions
thereto) the states that have abolished common-law marriage
either by statute or judicial decision. He ended by performing
somewhat of a judicial miracle. This last feat consisted in resur-
recting the one case1" that had ever questioned the validity of
a marriage because not performed in accordance with the Ohio
poses, that is, the children could not inherit, the wife took no dower,
etc.
4. That such marriages were invalid in some of the American colonies,
and certainly contrary to legislation and the policy of all the colonies.
5. That the earliest decisions in the United States are against the validity
of such marriages, but these decision are not referred to in the deci-
sions establishing the rule in this country.
6. That such marriages owe much of their validity to dicta of Chan-
cellor Kent in 18o9.
7. That the Kent doctrine was not generally accepted until more than
half a century later, the Supreme Court of the United States being
evenly divided on the question in 1843.
S. That the early decisions in this country, both those establishing the
rule and those denying it, are extremely poorly considered cases,
citing no authority and of only a page or two in length, whereas, the
English cases show that no one subject in their jurisprudence was
ever more carefully considered, one case alone covering nearly four
hundred pages.
9. That some States, apparently upholding the validity of common-law
marriages, have in effect discarded the rule consensus non concubitas
facit matrimonium, and adopted one, concubitas facit matrimonium.
In other words, some States require cohabitation in addition to words
of consent and thus we have one law providing that persons must
cohabit before they become husband and wife (in itself anomalous)
and another law providing that persons who do this without marrying
are guilty of a crime.
IO. That, strictly speaking, the common-law doctrine is in most States
recognized in name only; certainly in all of the states where the
question has arisen marriage per verba de futuro has been discarded
and the question of the validity of marriage per verba de praesenti
without cohabitation has not frequently arisen.
i i. That the American decisions show that the courts of this country
have not carefully investigated the subject.
z. That such marriages are opposed by the American Bar Association,
The Commission on Uniform State Laws, all modern authorities on
Sociology, Marriage and kindred subjects and should be abolished.
"'Bates v. State, 9 O.C.C. (N.S.) 273 (19o6) affirmed in part 77 0.8.
6zz, 84 N.E. 1132 (1907) (See note 47, supra).
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statutes11 since I 861, when Carmkkael v. State'2 had construed
such provisions to be merely directory and not mandatory.
Hailing this earlier opinion by Judge Hurin in Bates v. State
as "the finest and boldest opinion on this subject," Judge
Brewer twenty years later quoted verbatim from it, paragraph
after paragraph, in deliberate renewal of the challenge that the
Ohio Supreme Court had declined in 1907. That tribunal,
while affirming the circuit court's decision on the ground that
the evidence in the Bates case "did not establish a common-law
marriage," had refused to consider "whether such marriage if
proved would be a predicate for the indictment." As a result,
the Bates case remained decently interred for some thirty years,
although two years prior to the Speeler decision, Probate Judge
McClelland of Franklin County had stirred the dust over its
grave by quoting with approval one of Judge Hurin's para-
graphs in deciding In re Twellman. Moreover, its memory
had been kept alive by reference to the circuit court's views on
the degree of proof required for a common-law marriage in the
Drach v. Drack'4 and Dirion v. Brewer, Adm'r" decisions.
Judge Brewer concludes his interesting opinion in the
Speeler case as follows:
In 1907 the court with broad vision realized that the Carmichael
case was 45 years old. Now 30 years have again elapsed, this county
has increased greatly in size, the roads greatly improved, transportation
of such modern design never conceived at the writing of the Bates
decision. The covered wagon days are over. In this county there lives
no person who cannot in some manner easily reach the County Court
House, and partake of the gracious bounty of those, who are by law
endowed with the privilege of conducting the marriage ceremony. His-
tory has shown that at times, in years gone by, and still in some of the
more remote parts of the United States, that in order to get to a Court
3"Gen. Code, Secs. II81-11198 (1) Throckmorton's Ohio Code,
Annot. (1936). Title III, Ch. 4, Procedure in Probate Ct.
12 120.S. 553 (i86), f. n. 6, supra.is 32 O.N.P. (N.S.) 201 (1934).
4 9 0.N.P. (N.S.) 353 (1910).
15 2o 0. App. 298, 151 N.E. 8i8 (1925). Motion to certify record
overruled in 23 O.L. Rep. 589.
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House to obtain a marriage license, great hardships had to be undergone.
. . . By the wildest stretch of one's imagination such could not be the
case in Cuyahoga County and most certainly is not the fact in the case
at bar. A five-minute walk would have brought them to the court
house ...
Whether we seek to decide these facts in the light of common
decency, by the great weight of judicial decisions rendered by a long
line of illustrious jurists, or in the interests of those countless thousands
who are yet to reach a marriageable age-we can come to but a single
conclusion. In view of the authority vested in this court, it is impossible,
in good conscience, from the evidence shown, to hold this a common-law
marriage, or, to paraphrase the words of Judge Hurin "If the evidence
produced in this case constitutes a common-law marriage, in accordance
with the law of Ohio, some other court must first proclaim it."
It is unquestionably true that the facts in the Speeler case
are not typical; more frequently it is a woman who seeks to
obtain recognition as a common-law wife, or widow, as the case
may be; and the issue has arisen in prosecutions for bigamy,
divorce or annulment actions, proceedings to determine dower
right, to partition lands or to establish heirship. But in most of
the reported cases there are the same elements of uncertainty
and secrecy, of questionable relationship, of a compact formed
in wilful defiance of the practices of the society whose approval
is nevertheless sought, and whose laws are invoked for protec-
tion or material advantage by those who have flouted their
formal observance.
"There could be no better illustration," wrote Richmond
and Hall" in 1929, "of the way in which customs persist after
transplanting and after the excuse for them has long ceased to
be valid than is found in the fact that in 24' of our States com-
mon-law marriages are still tolerated. They are unlicensed,
unrecorded, and unaccounted, but recognized as legal. With
the multiplication of modes of travel and of other forms of
intercommunication, with the increasing need of an accurate and
complete recording of social data, with social welfare deeply
6 "Marriage and the State," (note 7, supra) PP. 29-30.
17 Now 23, inasmuch as the New York Legislature finally abolished com-
mon-law marriage by Laws of 1933, Chap. 6o6.
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involved in this question of the standards of marriage, these
. . . States still leave to the courts the decision as to whether
a given pair who have dispensed with the ceremony are married
or not. Not only do the decisions of no two of these States
agree, but courts in the same State are at variance and certain
individual courts have handed down contradictory decisions.
Hence there is little protection provided today for the woman
who believes she is a wife by common law; there is now nothing
better than a trap in this belated survival of early English law."
Somewhat irked, perhaps, by the persistent efforts of the
"reformers" of the first quarter of the century to secure passage
of legislation outlawing 'common-law marriage in those states
that tolerated it, Robert Black of the Ohio Bar, in 192818 wrote
a spirited defense of its continued recognition in which he
asserted that "The rule accepted in the courts of the United
States is Roman in concept if not in origin. It is not medieval
but classical; it does not depend upon the notion of a promise
being binding on the conscience and enforceable by a court of
conscience. It is not metaphysical or sacramental but practical,
depending verbally on proof [of] a status deliberately assumed
and publicly maintained. Its sole difficulties are those of proof
and lack of record." And in the same article he stated at page
115: "A legal doctrine will usually have a long history of
precedent, showing a certain consistency in principle, but with
a constant variation of application until the possibility of new
situations is exhausted and the rule becomes final unless a
change of social conditions necessitates a new examination.
When, therefore, it is proposed to reverse by legislative fiat a
settled formula of solution in a given set of conditions, it ought
to require more than adjectives to justify a change so radical."
(Italics supplied.)
It is submitted that social conditions have changed even
during the last ten years to such an extent as to justify a re-
examination of this subject by the Ohio Bar. The operation of
18 Common-Law Marriage, 2 Cincinnati Law Review, 1I3, 13 I.
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the Social Security Act" will again bring the consent marriage
to public attention and should be of particular interest to lawyers.
This legislation in providing monthly old-age benefits"° for
millions of qualified wage earners in covered employments upon
reaching sixty-five years, has at the same time provided for pay-
ments by the Federal Government in the event of the wage
earner's earlier demise.2 Moreover, if the wage earner should
die shortly after beginning to draw the monthly benefit the
difference between what the deceased received and 32 t% of
the total wages earned since December 31, 1936, will be paid
on application.22 In either event the "estate" or certain close
relatives of the wage earner receive the death payment. As the
Act becomes more familiar to our people and the benefits in-
crease in amount with the lengthening work period of the wage
earner, the "estates" thus created will be important to all strata
of society. There is every likelihood that the crop of alleged
common-law "widows" and "widowers" will show a marked
increase, as that relationship is usually asserted when pecuniary
gain warrants litigation.
Since January I, 1937, the Social Security Board has been
certifying lump-sum payments to the estates of deceased wage
earners, as provided by Section 2o422 of Title II of the Act.
"Pub. No. 271, 74 th Cong.; 49 Stat. 6zo (1935); 42 U.S.C.A. secs.
301-1305 (Supp. 1937).
20 42 U.S.C.A. sec. 40z (a) (Supp. 1937), "Every qualified individual
. . . shall be entitled to receive, with respect to the period beginning on the
date he attains the age of sixty-five, or on January 1, 1942, whichever is the
later, and ending on the date of his death, an old-age benefit . . . "
21 42 U.S.C.A., sec. 403 (a) (Supp. 1937), "If any individual dies before
attaining the age of sixty-five, there shall be paid to his estate an amount equal
to 3Y2 per centum of the total wages determined by the Board to have been
paid to him, with respect to employment after December 1, 1936."
•--, 42 U.S.C.A., sec. 403 (b) (c) (Supp. 1937).
23 42 U.S.C.A., sec. 404 (a) (Supp. 1937), "There shall be paid in a
lump-sum to any individual who, upon attaining the age of sixty-five, is not a
qualified individual, an amount equal to 3Y2 per centum of the total wages
determined by the Board to have been paid to him, with respect to employ-
ment after December 31, 1936, and before he attained the age of sixty-five."
Section 404 (b) directs payment to the wage earner's estate of "any part of
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When the amount payable to an estate is $5oo or less, the
Board in its discretion granted under Section 205 of Title II,24
may certify payments directly to those persons "entitled thereto
under the law of the State in which the deceased was domiciled."
Payment must be certified to an administrator or executor in-
stead of under Section 205,25 when the amount of the benefit
upon an alleged common-law marriage, his or her status must
be determined by the Board (or by the Court) in accordance
with the applicable laws governing the relationship in the par-
ticular case. "
Studies are now in progress in the Office of the Genera]
Counsel of the Social Security Board at Washington, as to bases
for determining marital status under the varying laws. It can
be readily understood that if the facts of any particular case
indicate that the relationship was entered into in a State other
than the domiciliary State of the deceased, additional compli-
cations arise.
any payment under subsection (a) which is not paid to him before his death."
A "qualified" individual must be at least sixty-five years of age and have
earned not less than $z,ooo in wages in covered employment before attaining
that age during five calendar years after December 3, 1936 [47 U.S.C.A.,
sec. 410 (c) (Supp. 1937)]. "Employment" means service of every nature
performed within the United States by an employee for his employer except:
(i) Agricultural labor; (z) domestic service in a private home; (3) casual
labor not in the course of the employer's trade or business; (4) service as an
officer or seaman on an American or foreign vessel; (5) employment by the
United States or an instrumentality thereof; (6) employment by a state, polit-
ical subdivision thereof, or instrumentalities of a state or states or their political
subdivisions; (7) service in the employment of exclusively religious, charitable,
scientific, literary, or educational organizations not operated for private profit.
[42 U.S.C.A., sec. 410 (b) (Supp. 1937)].
24 4z U.S.C.A.., sec. 405 (Supp. 1937).
2 4z U.S.C.A., sec 405 (Supp. 1937), reads as follows: "If any amount
payable to an estate under section 403 or 4o4 of this chapter is $5oo or less,
such amount may, under regulations prescribed by the Board, be paid to the
persons found by the Board to be entitled thereto under the law of the State in
which the deceased was domiciled, without the necessity of compliance with
the requirements of law with respect to the administration of such estate."
exceeds $5oo. In either event, if the applicant's claim is based
28 See the language of sec. 405 quoted in note z5, supra.
27 As to the practical difficulties and the question of good faith, the fol-
lowing quotation from one who encountered many, and grew somewhat skep-
COMMON-LAW MARRIAGE
DISCUSSION
All authorities agree that of the two forms of common-law
marriage, either (i) per verba de futuro cum copula or (2) per
verba de praesenti, the former have been outlawed in the United
tical in consequence, may be of interest. Otto E. Koegel, now Professor of
Domestic Relations in the National University Law School and formerly Asso-
ciate Counsel of the United States Veterans Bureau, gives a revealing picture
of the type of "common-law" marriage claims filed with that Federal agency:
"During the recent war the Bureau of War Risk Insurance had before it,
perhaps, more cases of alleged common-law marriages than are contained in
all of the reports of adjudicated cases put together. It must be remembered
that there were upwards of four millions of men in the military and naval
service. The men were compelled to make allotments from their pay to their
wives and children unless good cause was shown for exemption. The Exemp-
tion Section of the Bureau of War Risk Insurance considered more than one
hundred thousand claims for exemption from compulsory allotment, almost
ten thousand of which were cases of married men who entered the service as
single. Women claiming to be wives would file claim for family allowance and
an investigation would be instituted. The writer had charge of these cases for
a time and is in a position to say that by far the greater number of alleged
marriages were meretricious relationships, for the convenience of the parties
alone, and in a large percentage of the cases the reason no formal celebration
of marriage was had was because one or the other, and in many cases both, of
the parties were already married but separated from a former spouse ...
Moreover, very few, if any, of the persons really believe that they are mar-
ried. Scarcely any of these persons believe that a divorce is necessary to
dissolve the marriage; in fact, nearly all believe that common-law marriage
and living in adultery are synonymous terms. If it were a sine quo nons to the
validity of such a union that the parties believe that a divorce is necessary to
dissolve such a marriage (and a divorce is necessary as in any other marriage),
then there are few if any common-law marriages. . . . (As is elsewhere
shown, however, the parties may doubt the validity of the marriage and need
not consider themselves married 'in the eyes of the law'!) Few of such persons
believe that children of these unions are legitimate. But, says, the Supreme
Court, a strong reason for upholding such marriages is to legitimate the
offspring of many parents conscious of no violation of law. The first part of
this statement expresses a noble sentiment but the latter part borders on the
ridiculous. 'Many persons conscious of no violation of law,' is a phrase which
does not sound very well to one who has had actual experience in the handling
of many of these cases. Again considering the first part of the statement, if
these unions must be held valid marriages in order to render legitimate the
unfortunate children thereof, the children of subsequent formal marriages of
the parties must be bastardized. The great majority of common-law marriages,
so-called, are not permanent unions. After a while the parties tire of each
other and 'marry' someone else and have children." Koegel "Common Law
Marriage," pp. 101-103, supra, Note 9.
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States by judicial decree, 8 or have fallen with the State statutes
prohibiting consent marriages in toto.2"
It is interesting to note that of some thirty cases involving
common-law marriages that have been reported in Ohio, the
earliest, Duncan v. Duncan,"0 decided in 1859, expressly repudi-
28Marriage Laws and Decisions in the United States (i929); Vernier,
Vol. I. American Family Laws, 107 (931) and several authorities cited.
L.R.A. 1915E 33; 38 C.J. 1319, 132o, sec. 94, n. 43, 45. Two author-
ities make the definite statement that there is no decision in the United
States that de futuro marriages are valid. Madden, Persons and Domestic Re-
lations (931) 58; Jacobs, Cases on Domestic Relations (1933) 399 n. See
general discussion on common-law marriage in American jurisdictions, 39
A.L.R. 538; 6o A.L.R. 54I; 94 A.L.R. iooo; Billig and Lynch: Common-
Law Marriage in Minnesota: A Problem in Social Security (1938), zz Minn.
L. Rev. 177.
2 For effect of statutes on common-law marriages, see notes 2 L.R.A.
(N.S.) 353; L.R.A. 19I5E 113. Since de praesenti marriages continue, out-
side the States that have prohibited them, it should be remembered that such
marriages may rest on either express or implied contract. Where the contract
is in express terms, the courts must decide whether or not ensuing cohabitation
as husband and wife is necessary before the union will be recognized as a
common-law marriage. In cases of implied contract, the relationship of hus-
band and wife by mutual consent is assumed to exist by reason of cohabitation
and reputation. See z Schouler, Marriage, Divorce, Separation and Domestic
Relations, 6th ed. (192 1) sec. I 171, et seqz.; Keezer, Marriage and Divorce
2nd ed. (923) sec. 73- See Z7 Harvard Law Review 378 on general subject
of requisites and proof of common-law marriages.
30 Io O.S. i8S (1859). See note 6, supra. Eliza Duncan had filed a bill
in chancery with the Common Pleas Court of Cuyahoga County praying
assignment of dower as widow of Alexander Duncan, deceased. The lower and
district (circuit) courts awarded dower. Upon further appeal the Supreme
Court reversed the decree of the district court and ordered the original bill
dismissed. The facts were these: Deceased had been married in Ireland and
there abandoning his wife, he came to Ohio with two sons. Later at his
request Eliza, the petitioner, who had grown up in the same neighborhood,
and knew both deceased and his wife in Ireland, came to live with him in
Cleveland on the understanding that he would divorce his wife and marry her.
He introduced her as his wife and she passed as such among neighbors. Two
children were born of this union. No divorce was ever obtained and when
finally news arrived of the wife's death in Ireland, he renewed promise that
"he would marry her," but they continued as before until his death. The
Supreme Court, in excepting marriage per verba de praesenti from its reversing
opinion, inferentially upheld the lower courts' view that non-ceremonial mar-
riage was permissible under the Ohio Statute. In this connection read the
intermediate opinion in Dunva v. Duncan, 4 0. Dec. Rep. z6, Clev. L. Rep.
29 (1856), which held that the prohibitions and penalties in the statute
applied only to the officers who issued marriage licenses or solemnized the
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ated the de futuro marriage doctrine in the following words:
It seem to us that grave considerations of public policy forbid it;
that it would be alien to the customs and ideas of our people, and would
shock their sense of propriety and decency. That it would tend to
weaken the public estimate of the sanctity of the marriage relation; to
obscure the certainty of the rights of inheritance; would be opening a
door to false pretenses of marriage, and to the imposition upon estates of
supposititious heirs; and would place honest, God-ordained matrimony
and mere meretricious cohabitation too nearly on a level with each
other.
The decision, however, was at pains to point out that there
was no question involved of the validity of a marriage with
words of present consent, nor as to the presumption of a mar-
riage from reputation. Analyzing the celebrated English case
of the Queen v. Millis,1 the court decided that a mistaken doc-
trine had been advocated in the United States on the authority
of Chancellor Kent" and Greenleaf's text on evidence,3 that
a contract for a future marriage, followed by cohabitation as
husband and wife, is itself a valid marriage at common law.
This doctrine was rejected by the Duncan decision.
In i86i, Carmichael v. State"4 reviewed the Ohio statutes
regulating marriage then in force, and held that a marriage
entered into without compliance therewith might be made the
basis of a conviction for bigamy. The United States Supreme
Court had already ruled that such regulatory statutes, unless
express words of nullity in the statute so provide, shall be con-
strued as merely directory." In the Ohio case, John Carmichael
had appealed to the state Supreme Court from a conviction for
bigamy. The facts are not given in detail, but it appears from
the report that Carmichael, with one wife living, had had a
marriage, leaving the marriages themselves valid and binding. See also obiter
dictum on common-law marriages in Roberts v. Roberts, i 0. Dec. Rep. 368
(85 3 ) 8 West. L. J. 372.i so Clark & Finnelly's Reports 534.
32 Kent, z Com. 87.
2 Greenleaf, see. 46o.34 12 O.S. 553 (1861). See note 6, supra.
" Meister v. Moore, 96 U.S. 76 (1877).
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marriage "solemnized"" with another woman before a person
who had no license, as required by the Ohio statutes, to perform
such a ceremony. There was no other objection to the form of
the marriage and thereafter the parties had cohabited as man
and wife. Judge Gholson read the opinion of the court and first
construed the marriage statutes of Ohio, as follows:
* * . there is no provision that there shall be no marriage unless
solemnized as provided in the act, or that a marriage, unless so solem-
nized, shall be void. We are brought, then, to a rule of construction
which appears to be established by the authorities, that a marriage good
at the common law is good notwithstanding the existence of any statute
on the subject, unless the statute contains express words of nullity.
Bishop on Marriage and Divorce, sec. 167, and cases cited. . . . The
act of the general assembly"7 is "an act regulating marriages"; it does
not profess to create or confer a right to marry, but only to regulate the
exercise of a right, the existence of which is presupposed. The conse-
quences of denying validity and effect to the exercise of the right, would
be so serious, that an intention to do so, will not be inferred, but must
be dearly expressed ...
To constitute a marriage, it must appear from the acts of the parties,
for words on such an occasion are acts forming a part of the res gestae,
that they did, in the homely but strong language of our statute, "join
together as husband and wife."
38 In the Carmichael case also, a detailed discussion was had of Queen
v. Millis (io Clark & Finnelly Rep. 534). Inasmuch as the two cases were
analogous, the issue turning on the authority of the person who solemnized
the first marriage in the English and the second in the American case, it is
interesting to note that the decision arrived at by the Ohio court was directly
opposite to that of the majority of the English judges. Agreeing with the
minority that private contract marriages had been recognized for certain pur-
poses in England prior to Lord Hardwick's Act in 1753 (z6 Geo. II, c.3)
and could have been enforced by the ecclesiastical courts, Judge Gholson de-
dined to admit such authority in the United States, owing to the constitutional
separation of church and State. He nevertheless reasoned that the rule of the
common law as understood in England prior to the decision in Queen v. Millis
must have been in the minds of the Ohio legislators when they enacted the
State statute, and concluded that "We cannot construe our statute as restrictive
and prohibitory, as invalidating what, by natural law, the general law of soci-
ety, independent of statutory prohibition, would be regarded as a valid
marriage."
" Passed January 6, 18 4; took effect June i, 1824.; 29 Vol. Stat. 429
(set forth in full Ohio Revised Statutes, Vol i, i 86o, cited in code as Swan &
Critchfield 855)-
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How this shall appear, in any case in which it is alleged that persons
have joined together as husband and wife, without pursuing the mode
prescribed by the statute, must depend on the circumstances. There
must be a contract of present marriage, it must appear that the woman
was taken as a wife, and that the man was taken as a husband. The
circumstances of publicity in entering into the contract, and of cohabita-
tion thereafter as husband and wife, are most important to show the
intent with which any words were used, and without such circum-
stances, under the manifest policy of our laws on the subject, and the
habits and feelings of our people, an intent to form the honorable rela-
tion of marriage could not be properly found.
He then applied the law as above interpreted to the facts
before the court.
In this case those circumstances are clearly shown. It was a contract
of present marriage openly made, and followed by cohabitation as hus-
band and wife and we think was a valid marriage under the laws of
this state.
Being a valid marriage for other purposes, conferring on the parties
the rights of husband and wife we see no reason why the party whose
incapacity, from having another wife living, rendered the contract of
marriage a nullity, should escape on the ground of a want of form, from
the penalties of the statute against bigamy. On the contrary, if such a
marriage be legal for other purposes, it would be dangerous in the
extreme, to allow the mere form of the marriage to become a shield to
protetc those who commit such a crime.
In some thirty years following the Carmichael decision no
case directly involving a common-law marriage status seems to
have reached the Ohio courts. It is true that in Lawrence Rail-
road v. Cobb"s in 1878 and Bruner v. Briggs" in 1883, the
38 35 O.8. 94 (1878)- Catherine Cobb had brought an action against the
Lawrence Railroad Company for damage to her land and home by reason of
the defendant's road construction, alleging that she was a married woman in
order to save the action from the bar of the statute of limitations, which made
such exception. The railroad's answer denied that the plaintiff was a married
woman and the owner of the lot in question. Following a jury verdict for the
plaintiff, the defendant appealed, excepting in particular to the trial court's
charge that "to prove the marriage of the plaintiff, it is not necessary that
there should be record evidence of her marriage, or that persons should testify,
that they saw the wedding ceremony performed, but it would be sufficient if
you find that plaintiff and Mr. Cobb lived and cohabited together as husband
and wife and raised children." In which charge the Supreme Court found
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highest court in the State upheld marriages established by proof
of cohabitation and reputation, but whether the marriages them-
selves were ceremonial or by consent was not questioned. These
decisions, however, led to some confusion in later cases where
such evidence was offered in proof of an alleged common-law
marriage. The exact language of the Bruner case was "It is now
too well settled to admit of dispute, that in all civil actions,
when the right to succession of an estate depends on the existence
of a marriage, it may be proved by reputation, declarations and
conduct of the parties." It is evident that this rule relates to
proof of the marriage, not the fact of its existence.
no error because "the testimony showed thqt the plaintiff and Mr. Cobb had
been living and cohabiting as husband and wife for many years previous to the
construction of the railroad and had been regarded and treated in the neigh-
borhood as husband and wife, down to the date of the trial below."
39 39 O.S. 478 (883). Briggs, allegedly a surviving husband, brought
action against Bruner to have curtesy assigned him in land conveyed to the
latter by a daughter of Briggs' deceased wife. There had been no issue of the
alleged marriage between Briggs and the deceased. The Ohio statute of
descent and distribution (sec. 17 as amended by 66 O.L. za) allowed curtesy
to the surviving husband in all cases except when the deceased wife left issue
or a legal representative of such issue by a former marriage. It was necessary,
therefore, in order to recover, that Briggs not only prove his own marriage to
the deceased but that his wife had not been previously married. An amend-
ment (64 O.L. 105) to sec. 15 of the descent and distributions statute had
provided that "bastards shall be capable of inheriting or transmitting inheri-
tance from and to the mother . . . in like manner as if born in lawful
wedlock." A general clause provided that said latter amendment did not affect
the right to curtesy. The lower court found upon the evidence that Briggs
had proved his case, necessarily holding that the daughter was illegitimate. No
record evidence of Briggs' marriage to the deceased had been introduced on
the trial, nor was there any witness who saw them married. But evidence was
offered, running through many years, of cohabitation as husband and wife, of
mutual treatment and recognition of each other as such, and of such reputation
in the community and circle in which they moved. It was urged on the appeal
that more direct evidence should have been offered, since the marriage itself
was in issue, but the higher court considered the proof sufficient. The decision
seems to have been upheld on the competency of such evidence to establish the
marriage, its sufficiency being for the jury to determine. As to the conflicting
sections of the statute, it was held as a matter of law that while the illegitimate
daughter might inherit from her mother, the surviving husband's right to
curtesy therein could not be defeated.
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In Swartz v. State,4 0 the Eighth Circuit Court sustained a
conviction for bigamy, a judgment subsequently affirmed by the
Supreme Court. The indictment had charged that the accused
married Kitty Stoner while allegedly the husband of Henrietta.
The jury found upon the evidence that a common-law marriage
existed between Swartz and Henrietta, although the original
intercourse between them had been illicit. But for that feature
the appellate court stated that the marriage could unquestion-
ably have been established by reputation and cohabitation in a
criminal as well as in a civil action, provided the jury be con-
vinced by such evidence beyond a reasonable doubt. However,
the presumption that the original illicit relationship continued
must be overcome. Stating that in this case "every action of
these people for nine years was consistent with their being
husband and wife," the court decided that "The jury were
carefully instructed that unless they found beyond a reasonable
doubt that the relation of husband and wife existed between
Swartz and Henrietta, they could not find him guilty without
direct evidence of the contract having been entered into, and
that unless they found from all the evidence that such contract
had actually been entered into between them, they must find
him not guilty. We think that under the evidence the jury
might well find the defendant guilty of bigamy." The trial
court's definition of a common-law marriage, to the latter part
of which special exception had been taken on the appeal, merits
quotation:
A simple agreement, between one man and one woman, who may
lawfully so contract, that they will take one another as husband and
wife henceworht, and that they will sustain this relation thenceforth so
long as they both shall live, with the mutual understanding that neither
40 3 O.C.C. 6z; 7 O.C.D. 43 (1896); affirmed State v. Swartz, 35
Bull. 3 5 8. Evidence was introduced to the effect that Swartz and Henrietta
had cohabited for nine or ten years and were recognized in their community
and church as husband and wife; that they were the parents of two children
who bore family names, and were provided for by insurance taken out for their
benefit by their father; that Swartz had qualified as a voter by registering
himself a married man, and consistently spoke of Henrietta as his wife.
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one nor both can rescind the contract or destroy the relation, followed
by cohabitation; when they do this they are married. . . . And their
marriage is just and valid in Ohio as though a chime of bells played a
wedding march, and a half dozen bishops and clergymen assisted at the
celebration before a thousand people.
In spite of the floridity of this statement, the circuit court
held that "The definition of the common-law marriage was a
correct statement of the law in Ohio. . . that there may be
the relation of husband and wife subsisting between parties
where there has been no ceremony of marriage, is absolutely
settled, not only in very many other States, but in this State as
well," citing not Carmichael v. State4' but Railroad v. Cobb.42
In the same year and basing its decision in part upon the
Swartz decision, Johnson v. Dudley" held that a common-
law marriage may be proved from acts of recognition, cohabi-
tation and the birth of children, despite the fact that the parties
originally came together under a void contract, and that the
intercourse was at first illicit. The alleged wife had been the
slave of a planter in Alabama, in which State, of course, a
marriage between them was prohibited. The particularly
involved facts of this case are not important in this discussion.
Suffice it to say that the determination of the case turned on the
legitimacy of the heirs.
The court held that in addition to some testimony indicating
that a ceremonial marriage had been performed, the conduct
and long-continued cohabitation of the parties justified a
holding that a common-law marriage relationship during the
years of residence in Ohio had been established.
The court's reasoning on the "reputation" element is
arresting:
It is true that very many estimable people from Oberlin testified that
the general reputation, regarding the family at Oberlin was that they
were not married, but I think this is to be accounted for somewhat by
the reason that it was a case of a white man living with a colored
4' Note 34 supra.
42 Note 38 supra.
-13 30O.N.P. 196
, 40O.D. (N.P.) 243 (1896).
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woman. Had Malachi Warren been living with a woman of the same
blood as himself, under precisely the same circumstances, during all these
years, I doubt whether anybody in the town of Oberlin would have ever
questioned, from the fact of the relationship, his conduct and treatment
of his family, anything other than a lawful union. The very fact there-
fore, of the difference between the husband and the wife as to color,
would give occasion to remark, and by degrees acquire the force of
general reputation, . . . I do not feel like taking the testimony as to
reputation, and allow it to overcome the established fact as to the rela-
tionship and the origin of that relationship betveen Warren and his
wife. I think that in such a case, the law should make every reasonable
presumption in favor of legitimacy.
Three cases decided after the turn of the century in lower
Ohio courts may be briefly mentioned.
Mieritz v. Insrance Co.44 which was a Common Pleas
decision, definitely recognized that marriage in Ohio may be
entered into by present agreement followed by cohabitation and
holding out. The case involved recovery under an insurance
policy which the insurer sought to avoid because of certain
fraudulent misrepresentations made by the insured, one of
which was alleged to be that the deceased and plaintiff had
stated they were husband and wife. It appeared that at the
time the parties had entered into a ceremonial marriage in Ohio
in 1892 the wife had not been legally divorced from a former
husband in Germany, though the divorce decree was proved to
have been entered the following year. While stating that a
common-law marriage to be valid must be made in good faith,
the court charged the jury:
If you find that in September 1892, this plaintiff and the decedent
intended and agreed then to become husband and wife, and from that
time on to decedent's death cohabited as husband and wife, so treated
each other and so held themselves out in the community, they were from
and after March 18, I893, legally husband and wife; for from that
time she was marriageable, and continuance of the relation after that
date, entered into in September, 1892, in the way and for the purpose
I have stated, would be a ratification and a consummation of that
agreement.
448 O.N.P. 422, II O.D. (N.P.) 759 (i9OI). For opinion on excep-
tions to depositions, see 8 O.N.P. 460, ii O.D. (N.P.) 6oi.
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In Fergus v. Nash,45 decided in the Franklin Probate Court
in 1903, a marriage between a white woman and colored man,
although penalized under a prohibitory statute which neverthe-
less did not declare such marriages absolutely void, was held
valid inasmuch as the parties were considered to have entered
into the marriage according to the common law.
In re Barrett,46 decided the year following in the Hamilton
County Probate Court, presented an unusual situation, and is
an illustration of how steadfastly the courts of Ohio have
upheld the common-law form of marriage. The evidence
dearly established the existence of such a relationship during
some 17 years, both by contract and acts of the parties following
cohabitation. However, during her last illness the wife, because
of religious scruples, had sought to repudiate the relationship.
The court held that she could not divorce herself from Mr.
Barrett simply because she had changed her views on the subject
of common-law marriages.
We come now to the much discussed Bates" case.
This matter went through three courts and originated in
an indictment for bigamy charging that David Bates had mar-
ried a Miss Miller, having previously contracted a common-law
marriage with one Hazel Gintner which had not been dissolved
by death or divorce. The trial jury convicted the accused upon
evidence indicating that he and Hazel Gintner had cohabited
as husband and wife intermittently during a two-year period;
that he had acknowledged her as his wife to various friends;
and that in his mother's presence, he not denying the fact, he
had heard her say they had been married. Furthermore, that
at the time their child was expected he had assumed a husband's
responsibilities, engaging a physician, renting rooms and furni-
ture to make a home for Hazel, and, the child having been
45 48 Bull. 442 (903).
46 49 Bull. zz2 (i9o4), supra, note 3.
47 Bates v. State, 9 O.C.C. (N.S.) 273, 19 O.C.D. 189 (19O6), reversing
State v. Bates, 40.N.P. (N.S.) 503, 17 O.D. (N.P.) 3oi and affirmed in
part by Sttae v. Bates, 77 O.S. 6zz; 84 N.E. 1132 (1907). See notes IO,
supra, and 52, post,
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still-born, he had arranged for its burial, stating to the under-
taker that he was the husband and father.
On the appeal from sentence to the penitentiary, the circuit
court was requested by the attorney for Bates to consider the one
question as to "whether an indictment for bigamy can be based
upon a so-called common-law marriage followed by a marriage
to another person in accordance with the statutes of the State."
It was on this issue "and in the hope that our Supreme Court
may once for all establish a rule as to the standing of a so-called
common-law marriage in Ohio" that Judge Hurin, his associ-
ates on the circuit bench concurring, delivered the opinion so
commended in the Speeler case.48
Reviewing the statutory requirements affecting marriage,
and noting the detailed information necessary for record pur-
poses combined with the liberal provision made for either a civil
or religious ceremony, (preceded by publication of banns or
obtaining a license to marry) the court stated 4-- and these are
the paragraphs emphasized by Judge Brewer twenty years later
in the Speeler decision:
It thus appears that the Legislature has by most stringent rules pro-
vided for marriage in accordance with law. These requirements are in
form mandatory. There is an evident purpose of the Legislature to
strictly guard the institution of marriage with such legal requirements
as shall effectually protect the contracting parties and all others inter-
ested, and shall at the same time safeguard the interest of the state and
provide reliable records for future reference.
But notwithstanding these strict requirements of statute, it is claimed
by counsel for the state that there is another form of marriage equally
legal; that a marriage consummated in total disregard of the statutes
will be equally valid; that a private arrangement called a common-law
marriage entered into by the parties, without a license from the state,
without the publication of bans, without the services of minister or
magistrate, without any ceremony whatever, without witnesses to the
marriage itself, without any record of the existence of the marriage,
without any definite promise of marriage, is just as effectual, just as
legal and confers just the same rights upon the parties as a marriage
48 See note i, supra.
4' At p. 275.
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in strict conformity to the statutory requirements which, in positive terms,
specify the exact course of procedure requisite to a legal marriage, and
impose severe penalties for any violation of the rules prescribed.
The proposition is a startling one. If this be true, of what use are
the statutory requirements? Why punish with fine and imprisonment
the minister or magistrate or probate judge who inadvertently omits to
do any one of a dozen formal things required by statute to be done,
when none of these things are essential to a valid inarriage? Why
impose upon the contracting parties the expense and labor of filing state-
ments, under oath, regarding all sorts of statistical matters, and the
procuring of a license, and the securing of the services of minister or
magistrate, when all these things add nothing to the validity of a con-
tract which they themselves may enter into without any of these formal-
ities and without the embarrassment of witnesses? Why require
statistics to be compiled or provided for, when, if all these formalities
are unnecessary, they will certainly be neglected and the statistics will
certainly be incomplete and inaccurate?
Admitting that common-law marriage exists in many juris-
dictions, Judge Hurin proceeded to investigate its historical
basis. He analyzed the English and American cases, particularly
the Queen v. Millis and Carmichael v. State, observing with
regard to the Ohio decision:
1st, That the opinion thus enunciated was an obiter dictum, not
necessarily involved in the case then at issue which only related to the
question whether the absence of authority in the officiating clergyman
or magistrate, to solemnize a marriage, otherwise legal, render such
marriage void. The broad question of the validity of a marriage in total
disregard of the statutory law was not involved in that case; 2d, That
as that case was decided before the adoption of the rule making the
syllabus the law of the case, we are permitted to look to the actual facts
of that case and to disregard the strict rule of its syllabus except in so
far as it applies to the case then decided; 3 d, That an examination of
the reasoning of the learned judge, who rendered that opinion, makes
it plain that his opinion is based, not on any authority in England or
elsewhere, but upon his conception of what ought to be the law applicable
to such a case. In fact, he reaches his conclusions after a somewhat
painstaking effort to show that the English authorities support an exactly
contrary view.
And concluding:
Ordinarily this court would feel bound, of course, to follow a
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decision of the Supreme Court, but a dictum of that court in a case not
involving the exact question before us, and especially when avowedly
opposed to the recognized authorities of common law, seems at least to
require careful consideration before it can be applied to the case at bar,
where the facts present no analogy to those of the case, in which such
dictum was expressed.
The Carmichael case was decided forty-five years ago. In that
time there has been a vast change in the condition of society. It is a
matter of common knowledge that in these latter days the stability of
the family is threatened as never before by loose ideas of marriage. The
family is the foundation of the state. Marriage is the basis upon which
the family rests.
It seems to us that the importance of the question is such as to
demand an independent consideration, and in the hope that the Supreme
Court will have an opportunity of finally passing upon this question and
settling the law of the state, we venture to disregard the decision of
Carmichael v. The State, in so far as it seems to us to extend beyond
the actual facts of that case and to lay down a rule on matters not
involved therein.
The court then considered the evidence in the Bates case and
held that David Bates and Hazel Gintner had deliberately
ignored the law and that the State had failed to prove any
promise of marriage either present or future, though the accused
admitted the latter. Indeed the actual basis of the State's claim
appeared to be the cohabitation. While acknowledging that
such evidence had been held sufficient in divorce proceedings to
establish the marriage sought to be dissolved, the court cited
authority"0 that it could not be adduced in proof of a former
marriage as a ground for the divorce, and discussed other Ohio
cases in which proof of marriage was involved." Moreover, in
a criminal action more direct evidence of an actual marriage was
held essential; cohabitation, and admission of marriage by the
accused being regarded as merely corroborative.
Noting that one of the reasons stated in the Carmichael case
for upholding non-ceremonial marriages was that "notwith-
50 Houpt v. Houpt, 5 0. 539.
61 TVolverton v. State, 16 0. 173; Edgar v. Richardson, 33 0.S. 593;
Bruner v. Briggs, 39 O.S. 478, supra, note 39.
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standing any statute on the subject a common-law marriage is
good, unless the statute contains express words of nullity, the
court, at page 2 85, remarked:
But if our understanding of the common law rule as to marriage
is correct, such marriage was never good in England, except for limited
purposes and has never been adopted in Ohio and therefore the supposed
historic reason for this rule as to the interpretation of statutes fails.
The marriage statutes of Ohio are in form mandatory. We have
found no rule of common law or ecclesiastical law that would justify
us in supposing that the Legislature meant anything else than what the
statute so expressly declares. We know no rule of statutory construction
that justifies us in reading into the statute a negation of its express terms.
The repeated provisions for severe penalties on all those who neglecf or
fail to follow the precise formalities of the law as to marriage, seem to
negative any idea that the Legislature ever intended or had in mind
any other legal form of marriage.
It would seem a strange anomaly if a civil contract leasing real
estate, or agreeing to answer for the debt of another or an agreement
made upon consideration of marriage, is to be held void unless in writing
signed by the parties to the agreement; yet marriage itself, the most
sacred and momentous contract in its consequences which it is possible
for man to enter into, may be made by merely verbal promises or even
without such promises.
It is strange if our laws, in order to insure the stability of land titles,
require a record of every deed and instrument conveying title, yet
require (by implication) no record of the title on which the family name
and honor, the property rights of wife and children, and the very legit-
imacy of the children themselves depends.
Reiterating that the evidence under review tended to show
that Hazel Gintner did not consider herself legally married to
David Bates, Judge Hurin concluded:
But common-law marriages, however we are to understand that
term, are not yet so common as to be recognized anywhere as anything
but exceptional. Our marriage laws are, and have always been, well
known and understood, and a legitimate ceremonial marriage, either
civil or religious, is the universal desire of all decent people contemplating
matrimony.
To break down the bars established by the statute, to make possible
the substitution of loose and uncertain requirements for the time honored,
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fixed forms of the law is to open the way to all the forms of fraud and
crime with which designing men may seek to destroy womanly virtue
and with which unscrupulous women may seek to appropriate the good
name and wealth of men to whom in life they were perhaps perfect
strangers.
If a private arrangement without any formalities, and without any
writing or any record or any witnesses, is to be upheld as a civil contract;
if secret marriages, known only to the parties themselves and participated
in by none other are to be authorized; if the state is to have no right to
protect its own interests, it is but one step further to the practice, now
publicly advocated by certain notorious criminals and others, of having
marriages on probation, the relation to cease at the will of either of the
parties.
If such is to be the law of Ohio, some other court must be the first
to proclaim it. The judgment of the court of common pleas will be
reversed, and the cause remanded for further proceedings.
The Supreme Court of Ohio, however, to which further
appeal was taken by the accused, did not avail itself of the
opportunity to reconsider the subject of common-law marriage,
so eloquently afforded to it by Judge Hurin. Instead, it
affirmed' 2 the judgment entered on his decision solely on the
ground that the evidence in the Bates case "did not establish
a common-law marriage."
It was not until 1912, in Umbenhower v. Labus53 that the
highest court in the State rendered an authoritative decision
affecting common-law marriages in Ohio.
In the interval one other case was decided by the Insolvency
Court of Hamilton County in 191o. This was Drach v. Drach,"
a divorce action in which a common-law marriage was held to
be established by a writing acknowledging the same by the
husband, followed by cohabitation and publicity. Citing the
52State v, Bates, 77 O.S. 62z; 84 N.E. 1132 (907). "Judgment
affirmed, on the ground that evidence did not establish a common-law mar-
riage. Whether such marriage, if proved, would be a predicate for the indict-
ment not considered."
53 85 O.S. 238, 97 N.E. 832 (1912), affirming Umbenhowerv. Umben-
Iower, lz O.C.C. (N.S.) z89, 21 O.C.D. 317.
54 9 N.P. (N.S.) 353, 55 Bull. 86 (I91O). This case is also quoted as
authority for the indissolubility of common-law marriages except by death or
divorce.
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Danca 5 and Carmichael 6 decisions in answer to defendant's
assertion that there existed some doubt that consent marriages
were valid in Ohio, the Court concluded that, "As the common
law is the foundation of the law of the State of Ohio, it follows
that until the Legi~lature in its wisdom declares against the
validity of common-law marriages that they must, when proven,
be enforced by the courts of the State."
This case is particularly interesting because it distinguished
the evidence required in proof of a common-law marriage.
There are two ways in which a common-law marriage may be
shown. One is specified in the statute on divorce and alimony in this
state wherein it is enacted that proof of cohabitation and reputation may
be given, and may be sufficient in the opinion of the court to establish
marriage and justify subsequent divorce. This is, perhaps, the usual way
in which common-law marriages are determined to exist.
It will be observed that where the proof relates to cohabitation and
reputation that evidence is not introduced of the original contract, but
the original contract is assumed and presumed to exist from the fact of
cohabitation and reputation, and this kind of evidence being purely pre-
sumptive, may be rebutted by other evidence, and when this occurs it
becomes the duty of the court under such circumstances to determine
whether or not under all the evidence a common-law marriage should
be presumed to exist in the case.
The other mode of showing the existence of a common-law marriage
is to prove the contract by direct evidence thereof, and when the contract
is proven, clearly and decidedly, no evidence under the common law is
required as to subsequent cohabitation or reputation to establish such
contract.
Admittedly, the decisions in Carmichael v State" and Bates
v. State8 may have thrown some doubt on these rules, the
former emphasizing the necessity of publicity and reputation;
the latter that of cohabitation and reputation. The court called
attention to the stricter rule followed in criminal cases where
the element of intent is important and more direct evidence
" Note 30, supra.
51 Note 34, supra.
57 Note 34, supra.
58 Note 47, supra.
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required. The Draca contract was held sufficient to establish
the marriage, but "if it needed cohabitation and reputation and
publicity to give point to the marriage and to make it valid, that
exists in this case."
In Umben/zower v Labas9 the leading case on common-law
marriages in Ohio, the issue arose in this wise: In a partition
action brought by Lee Umbenhower against his sister Hazel,
each alleged to be seized in fee of undivided one-half interest
in land sought to be divided, as sole heirs of Willard P. Umben-
hower, one Grace Helen Labus (called Umbenhower) inter-
vened and was made party defendant. The latter claimed to
be one of the heirs of Willard P. and as such seized in fee of
one-third interest in such lands, as tenant in common with Leo
and Hazel. She alleged that she was the issue of Willard P.
and his second wife Margaret. The children of the first mar-
riage denied the validity of the second and asserted that Grace
Helen was illegitimate offspring. The lower court found in her
favor and ordered partition among the three children, which
judgment was affirmed by the circuit court, and further appeal
taken to the Supreme Court.
It appeared that the first wife of Willard P., the mother of
Leo and Hazel, had divorced him in 19oo, inferentially because
of his friendship with Margaret, later the mother of Grace
Helen. Margaret and Willard were not married as prescribed
by statute but, said the court, "It is asserted that they entered
into a solemn contract of marriage to take effect in praesenti,
which was accomplished and followed by cohabitation as man
and wife, with notice to the society in which they moved and by
announcement on all proper occasions that they sustained that
relation to each other."
" Note 53, supra. It is interesting to note that on the authority of the
circuit court's decision, while final appeal still pending, Fultz v. Fultz, 9
O.N.P. (N.S.) 593 (i95o), held that a common-law marriage might not be
predicated upon the presumption of a former husband's death, without an
agreement between the parties to become husband and wife, followed by
cohabitation as such.
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Reviewing the earlier Ohio cases of Carmichael v. State,"
Railroad v. Cobb, "' and Bruner v. Briggs,"' but ignoring the
Bates"2 decision, the Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of
the lower court that a common-law marriage had been proved
by the evidence adduced." Equal validity in Ohio of cere-
monial and consent marriages was declared in the following
language:
A contract of marriage is essential in either case. The performance
of a mere ceremony does not constitute a marriage. It must follow and
be founded on contract. In one case, the consummation of the contract
may be celebrated and observed with or according to statutory ceremony.
In the other, the evidence of the marriage, in part at least, consists in
the immediate and continued course of conduct of the parties in reference
to each other in their domestic and social life. The contract of marriage
60 Note 34, supra.
"oa Note 38, supra.
61 Note 3 9, supra.
62 Note io, supra.
63 Margaret's testimony was as follows:
"Billy then said to me 'The court won't give us no license' and he took
my hand, and he said 'I pledge myself as true and lawful husband to you the
longest day I live,' and I said to Billy, 'I pledge myself as true and lawful
wife to you the longest day I live,' and he slipped his mother's wedding ring
on my finger, and he kissed me, and he said, 'if we ever have any children,
they will hold us together."
The ring was put in evidence. With regard to this testimony the Court
said:
"The terseness and precision of the above language almost staggers belief;
for it would, on first impression, seem inconceivable that persons of such walk
in life would be capable of selecting and adopting such apt language to express
their contract of marriage. * * * No one was present to corroborate or deny
what the witnesses said, and if there were no circumstances of corroboration a
court might hesitate in believing the story to such degree as to determine
important interests resting solely on its verity."
The corroborative evidence consisted of the birth of a child (Grace
Helen) entered in a Bible in their possession; the fact that the woman gave
up her position in a laundry and cohabited with Willard as man and wife and
that they held themselves out to the public as such. After the child's birth he
treated her as his child and cared for her until his death.
Noting that the lower court had sustained the marriage on this proof,
"While the narrative of the mother is not alone above suspicion and lacks
conviction beyond doubt, we cannot say the lower court was clearly wrong in
founding its judgment on the evidence adduced and found in the record. If
true, there was a contract of marriage per verba tie praesenti, and the event
was followed consistently by the usual indicia of the marriage relation."
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need not be in writing in either, but may exist in parol. If it is cere-
monially solemnized, the evidence of its consummation may be made
a matter of record, if authorized by statute, and may be proved by
eyewitnesses, admissions, cohabitation, etc. if the record evidence is not
made, or, if made, is lost or destroyed. So it would seem that marriage
rests on contract, and the state recognizes it as a civil contract, and it
may be proved by competent parol proof and circumstances, when the
degree of proof is clear and satisfactory to the court or jury ...
* * * the validity of a so-called common-law marriage has never
been repudiated, when established by sufficient competent evidence, but
has been clearly recognized. Indeed, the history of civilized society will
show that in primitive times, and all down the line of its advancement,
marriage relations were created by mutual contract of competent parties,
without ecclesiastical or statutory ceremony. While it is true, Legisla-
tures, from time to time, have endeavored to prescribe methods and
formalities of marriage, and proper records of the same, in the interest
of decency and good morals, and to thus exalt and make sacred the
married state, it cannot be forgotten that no law has made such methods
and formalities exclusive. In this respect, as in many others, there is
always a stratum of society that prefers to shun or disregard legal cere-
monies and adopt a coarser and less conspicuous way of forming domestic
ties. It is the innocent offspring of such citizens that the law would
mercifully protect, and rather call them heirs than bastards.
The syllabus by the court definitely states that "An agree-
ment of marriage in praesenti, when made by parties competent
to contract, accompanied and followed by cohabitation as hus-
band and wife, they being so treated and reputed in the com-
munity and cirde in which they move, establishes a valid
marriage at common law; and a child of such marriage is
legitimate and may inherit from the father."*
* Editor's Note. This is the first part of Miss Moynahan's article. The
remaining part will appear in the March issue.
